California Taxation of Literary Properties by Keesling, Frank M. & Brucker, Alex M.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 2 | Number 2 Article 1
1-1-1979
California Taxation of Literary Properties
Frank M. Keesling
Alex M. Brucker
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank M. Keesling and Alex M. Brucker, California Taxation of Literary Properties, 2 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 263 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol2/iss2/1
California Taxation of Literary Properties
By FRANK M. KEESLING*
ALEx M. BRUCKER**
William Shakespeare could not have realized how relevant
Hamlet's statement "the play's the thing. . ."I would be to the
taxation of literary properties. This line is symbolic of the con-
tinued battles waged between various taxing entities and the
motion picture and recording industries over the taxability of
literary properties. Controversies over the application of Cali-
fornia's property, sales and use taxes to literary properties
have been in progress since 1933. Several attempts have been
made to change the'Shakespearian statement to "the paper on
which the play is 'written is the thing" and thereby permit taxa-
tion, directly or indirectly, of intangible creative talents which
should be exempt from California sales, use and property
taxes.
The legal problems associated with the taxation of property
and retail sales arise from the fact that in order to reproduce,
preserve and communicate intangible creative talents and
ideas, it is necessary to record them on tangible media such as
film and tapes.
This article will review and discuss these problems; special
attention and emphasis being accorded to the determination
by the State Board of Equalization 2 that the sales or use tax
applies to the amounts including royalties received by record-
ing artists for their participation in the production of master
tapes or sound recordings.3
* Tax Partner, Loeb and Loeb, Los Angeles, California; Member, State Bar of Cal-
ifornia; A.B., 1928, University of California, Berkeley; L.L.B., 1931, Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California, Berkeley.
** Tax Associate, Loeb and Loeb, Los Angeles, California; Member, State Bar of
California; Certified Public Accountant; B.S., 1967, San Diego State University; J.D.,
cum laude, 1974, Whittier College School of Law, Los Angeles.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act II, Scene ii, line 590. (1604-05).
2. The California Board of Equalization (the "Board") is charged with the re-
sponsibility of prescribing rules and regulations relative to the property tax laws. Ex-
cept for the assessment of public utility property by the Board, such laws are
administered by local officials. The Board administers the Sales and Use Tax Acts.
3. See, e.g., Veenhuis, Selected California Tax Problems of the Entertainment In-
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I. Motion Pictures and Master Tapes-General Analysis
A. Motion Pictures
A motion picture is an audiovisual production which takes
an original story or play, or an original adaptation of an ex-
isting story or play, and records the story on negative film and
the dialogue, music and other sounds on a sound track. The
negative thus contains a series of images which, together with
the synchronized sound track, reproduces the story or play.
Positive or exhibition prints, with accompanying sound
tracks, are made from the negative and are distributed to thea-
ters through licensing agreements. The story or play is com-
municated to the theater's patrons by the use of a projector
and speakers. The tangible material in negative and positive
films and sound tracks performs much the same function as
that performed by the paper on which a story or play is written;
it is a medium of expression.
Some motion picture producers handle the distribution of
their pictures to theaters themselves. Others arrange for such
distribution by an independent distributing company. In ei-
ther case, only a license is granted for the commercial repro-
duction and exploitation of the picture.' Ownership of all
property rights, tangible and intangible, is retained by the pro-
ducer.
B. Master Tapes
A master tape, or sound recording, is solely an audio produc-
tion and is produced by a process similar to that employed in
the production of a motion picture sound track. A producer ar-
ranges for artists to perform music and lyrics. The perform-
ances are recorded on tapes and may be repeated several
times. Each performer's part is recorded on a separate track.
The producer then selects the best artistic portion of each per-
formance and mixes all of the portions into what is known as a
''master tape."
If the master tape is produced by an independent producer,
it is made available to a record-making company for distribu-
dustry, 28 S. CAL. TAX INST. 853 (1976); Putnam, Application of California Sales and
Use Tax Law to Selected Types of Transactions, 23 S. CAL. TAX INST. 289 (1973); Note,
Indirect Taxation of Motion Picture Copyright, 15 STAN. L. REV. 372 (1963).
4. Federal copyright law protects motion pictures against unauthorized reproduc-
tion. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (Supp. 1 1977).
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tion, usually pursuant to a license to use the tape for record
making purposes. In some instances, an independent producer
will sell the master tape to the record-making company, trans-
ferring all property interests in the tape except whatever pub-
lishing rights may belong to the composer.
Regardless of how commercial exploitation rights to the
master tape are acquired, the master tape is utilized in an intri-
cate process to produce records for sale to the general public.
The first step consists of using the master tape to make a "lac-
quer master," a metal disc with a vinyl surface. The lacquer
master is then used to produce a "mother record," (a model for
the ultimate record) from which "stampers" are produced.
Several stampers of each sound recording are made and used
by the producer or record company to press records for com-
mercial distribution.
When hiring a recording artist to perform, the producer pays
for the artist's creation, a new expression and use of musical
composition which gives the sound recording its value in the
highly competitive commercial market. If the performance re-
corded on the master tape is not of high technical and artistic
quality, the producer will have the recording artist remake the
sound recording in additional performances, or the producer
may choose not to distribute the record. The recording artist is
transferring to the producer his intangible creative perform-
ance. The tangible medium of communication, the master
tape, is merely incidental.
Although the mechanical processes involved in making
records differ somewhat from those involved in producing
books, plays, or motion picture prints, there is one important
similarity. Each process involves a recording of intangible lit-
erary property on a tangible medium employed merely for the
purpose of reproduction. In each case, the tangible property
itself has little inherent value.
As with motion picture films, federal law provides statutory
copyright protection of master tape productions against unau-
thorized reproduction.
II. Federal Copyright Characterization of Motion Pictures
and Master Tapes as Intangible Personal Property
One of the most important American political values is that
5. Id. at § 102(a) (7).
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the public should benefit from the free and open communica-
tion of new ideas, technology and knowledge without govern-
mental interference.' In order to promote this ideal, the
Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to reward authors with a copyright monop-
oly over their works for a limited period of time.' This monop-
oly enables authors to effectively profit from their creations,
thereby encouraging them to produce more literary and artistic
works, which ultimately benefits the public.'
The United States Supreme Court, ruling in Stevens v. Glad-
ding,' held that implicit in the Copyright Clause is the princi-
ple that the copyright protection of an author's expression is
an intangible property right which is separate and distinct
from the tangible medium in which the expression is commu-
nicated. In Stevens, a creditor acquired a copper plate used for
printing a map. The former owners of the plate sought to en-
join the creditor from unauthorized reproduction and sale of
the map. The creditor alleged that ownership of the copper
plate (i.e., the tangible medium used to communicate the au-
thor's expression) gave him the right to produce copies and
sell them. The Supreme Court held that the map was intangi-
ble property which was separate and distinct from the copper
plate, and that acquisition of ownership of the copper plate did
not carry with it the ownership of and the right to reproduce
and to sell copies of the map.10
Consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court in Ste-
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
have the Power . .. [to] promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."
8. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.03[A]. See also Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) wherein the Court states: "The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
the encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.'"
9. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1854). See also Stevens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528
(1852).
10. Accord, Werckmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 F. 808 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.,
1894); Capitol Records Inc. v. Mercury Record Corp., 109 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebraska, 58 F. Supp. 523 (D. Neb. 1944),
afd, 157 F.2d 744, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809; Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Classified Geo-
graphic, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1939); Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45
Cal. App. 2d 464, 114 P.2d 370 (1941).
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vens, the Copyright Act of 1976 sets forth the legislative dis-
tinction between the exclusive property right of an author in
his expression of new ideas, technology and knowledge (the
subject matter of the copyright protection), which is an intan-
gible property right, and possession of the material objects or
medium in which the expression is communicated which is a
tangible property right." The courts have universally applied
this distinction to enforce the rights of the owner of a copy-
righted work when the tangible medium which is used to copy,
to reproduce or to communicate the work has passed to one
who, without authorization, attempted to reproduce the work
commercially.12
While the copyright is a creature of federal statute, the states
have also provided protection for authors' works. California
and New York, for example, have enacted statutes to protect
authors from unfair competition or unauthorized use of their
works.' 3 California has also enacted a penal statute in re-
sponse to the growth of record piracy.'4
III. Application of the Calfornia Property Iar to Motion
Pictures and Master Tapes
A. Property Taxation of Intangible Property-A General Analysis
The legislative authority to impose an ad valorem tax on all
California property derives from the California Constitution. 5
The Constitution provides that all forms of tangible personal
11. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (Supp. 1 1977) provides as follows:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright,
is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embod-
ied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any
rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of
an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive
rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
12. See cases cited at notes 9-10, supra.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-85 (Deering 1971) and N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw, art. 12-E,
§§ 223-24 (McKinney 1968). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14700-40 (Deering 1975).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (Deering 1971) (forbidding the sale and transfer of
sound recordings without the consent of the owner). See Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973), holding § 653h constitutional and within a state's concurrent power
over the protection of new ideas and forms of expression, thereby creating a state cop-
yright.
15. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (Deering Supp. 1979), which provides that all prop-
erty, unless exempt by the California Constitution or laws of the United States, is sub-
ject to an ad valorem (according to value) tax at a percentage of the fair market value
of the property.
property, and specified intangibles, are subject to the tax, 6 un-
less otherwise exempt. 7
California property tax laws (as well as the sales and use tax
laws) are codified in the California Revenue and Taxation
Code.'" The Code defines "property" to include "all matters
and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of private owner-
ship"" and "personal property" to include all property other
than real estate. 20 The Code, consistent with the California
Constitution, provides that all property is subject to taxation,2 '
unless it falls into one of the many specifically enumerated
statutory exemptions.2 2 The property tax is imposed upon the
full cash value of taxable property. County assessors are
charged with the responsibility of assessing annually all taxa-
ble property at its full cash value as of the tax lien date, March
1.23
The problem of whether the property tax may be imposed
upon any intangible personal property other than that listed in
the California Constitution and the Code 24 was initially consid-
ered in Roehm v. County of Orange.2 3 Roehm involved the im-
position of the property tax upon a liquor license which
permitted the proprietor of a restaurant to serve alcoholic bev-
erages. The California Supreme Court held that the liquor li-
cense was intangible personal property and was exempt from
the property tax.26 The court reasoned that the expressed in-
tent of the Constitution and the property tax statutes was that
only listed intangibles were subject to taxation. Therefore, the
liquor license, a nonenumerated intangible, was exempt from
16. CAL. CONST. art. XIII § 2. The forms of intangible property subject to taxation
are "shares of capital stock, evidences of indebtedness, and any legal or equitable in-
terest therein . . . ." Id.
17. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII § 3 (Deering Supp. 1979); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 202-33 (Deering 1975 & Supp. 1979).
18. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 101-5801 (Deering 1975 & Supp. 1979) (property
taxes); id. at §§ 6001-7176 (sales and use taxes) [hereinafter cited generally as the
Code].
19. Id. at § 103.
20. Id. at § 106.
21. Id. at § 201.
22. CAL. CONST. art. XIII § 3 (Deering Supp. 1979); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 202-33
(Deering 1975 & Supp. 1979).
23. Id. at § 401.
24. CAL. CONST. art. XIII § 3 (Deering Supp. 1979); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 202-33
(Deering 1975 & Supp. 1979).
25. 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 (1948).
26. Id. at 289-90, 196 P.2d at 556.
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taxation.2 7
However, while the court held that the liquor license was in-
tangible personal property exempt from the personal property
tax, it opened the door for the indirect property taxation of the
exempt intangible personal property. The court ruled that a
County could compute the full cash value of taxable tangible
property by taking into consideration earnings derived from
and dependent upon the possession of intangible rights and
privileges. 28 Since Roehm, all intangible rights and privileges,
unless exempted by legislation, theoretically could be indi-
rectly taxed by attributing their inherent value to the tangible
property in which the intangible rights are embodied.
27. Id. at 284-89, 196 P.2d at 553-56. The County's argument in Roehm, if approved
by the Court, would have subjected the entire value of the license to direct taxation.
The County asserted that the property tax should be imposed because the license: (a)
was an exclusive right granted by the state to serve alcoholic beverages; (b) had sub-
stantial value because of its exclusivity and limited issuance; (c) was transferable; (d)
having value, it became a part of the stock in trade along with all other tangible prop-
erty of the owner; (e) is the subject of execution and attachment; and finally (f) having
all these characteristics of tangible property, the distinction between tangible and in-
tangible property rights was tenuous.
The court's concern over, and rejection of, the County's argument was expressed as
follows:
Virtually the same reasoning could be advanced for the taxation of other
forms of governmental permits, stock exchange seats, press association mem-
berships, memberships in social, professional, and fraternal clubs, patents,
copyrights, goodwill, judgments, causes of action, and insurance policies,
which have never been taxed as property in this state during its entire exist-
ence.
Id. at 283, 196 P.2d at 552. The court also stated:
What appears from the constitutional provisions by clear implication is ex-
pressly stated in section 111 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which defines
intangibles and intangible personal property for purposes of taxation: "'In-
tangibles' means intangible personal property of a type not exempt from taxa-
tion and any interest therein. 'Intangible personal property' means only
notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of
trust, and mortgages." . . . It is clear that it is the purpose of section 111 to
confine the meaning of intangible personal property to the intangibles listed,
not to establish the fiction that intangible assets other than those therein spec-
ified are tangible personal property.
Id. at 285, 196 P.2d at 553-54 (Italics added by the Roehm court).
28. Id. at 285, 196 P.2d at 554, where the court stated:
Intangible values, however, that cannot be separately taxed as property may
be reflected in the valuation of taxable property. Thus, in determining the
value of property, assessing authorities may take into consideration earnings
derived therefrom, which may depend upon the possession of intangible rights
and privileges that are not themselves regarded as a separate class of taxable
property. . .
For a critical analysis of Roehm, see Note, Liquor License Not Subject to Property
Tax, 1 STAN. L. REv. 370 (1949).
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As new technology developed and business grew in Califor-
nia, new intangible property rights were created. Assessors,
relying upon Roehm, continued the indirect property taxation
of intangibles. However, where the state had a significant
stake and compelling interest in the future growth of the
state's business community,' the California legislature re-
sponded to each attempt at indirect taxation of intangible
property rights by enacting exemptions.2 9
B. Motion Pictures
Prior to the decision of the California Supreme Court in
Michael Todd Company, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,30 mo-
tion picture negatives had been assessed and taxed as tangible
personal property. In the early 1930's, industry members
strenuously objected to the method of taxation employed. The
Los Angeles County Assessor, Mr. Quinn, made several con-
cessions to the industry. One important concession was that
after positive or exhibition prints of the negative were made,
the total cost of producing the picture would be divided among
the estimated number of prints to be made. Except for a nomi-
nal property tax on old negatives and prints stored in a produ-
cer's film library, only those prints stored at the producer's
California studio on the tax lien date would be subject to as-
sessment and tax. Accordingly, those prints shipped out of
California prior to the tax lien date were exempt from assess-
ment and tax.
This concession is illustrated by the following example. As-
sume that 400 prints are made of a motion picture costing
$10,000,000. Each print therefore costs $25,000. On the tax lien
29. See, e.g., Western Title Guar. Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 41 Cal. App. 3d 733,
116 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1974), which held, on the basis of Roehm, that the value and earn-
ings attributable to the real estate title data of a title company which was fixed to the
title company's paper records could properly be used to value the tangible paper
records. Soon after the holding in Western Title, the legislature enacted CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE § 997, which provided that the cash value of business data is the cash value
of the tangible materials in which such business records are embodied and such value
shall not include the value attributable to any intangible rights in the information or
data.
See also CAL. REV. & TA. CODE § 986 (Deering 1975) (providing that the full value of
"works of art" is the cash value of the tangible materials); Id. at § 995 (relating to stor-
age media for computer programs).
For views contrary to Roehm, see Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of As-
sessments & Taxation, 320 A.2d 52 (Md. 1974); Heinzman, Computer Software: Should
it be Treated as Tangible Property for Ad Valorem Tax?, 37 J. TAX. 184 (1972).
30. 57 Cal. 2d 684, 371 P.2d 340, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Todd].
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date, 100 prints are still at the producer's studio, and the other
300 have been shipped out of California. Since only 100 of the
prints were present in California on the lien date, only
$2,500,000, or one-fourth of the total cost of the motion picture,
would be taken into account for property tax assessment pur-
poses. If none of the prints had been shipped and were in Cali-
fornia on the tax lien date, the entire value of the motion
picture would be subject to assessment and tax. If, on the
other hand, all of the prints had been shipped, there would be
no tax.
Another important concession which Mr. Quinn made was to
agree that the ratio of assessed value of motion picture films to
the cost of such films would be substantially lower than in the
case of all other tangible personal property. These and similar
favorable policies were continued for many years.
The policy of assessing only prints located in California led
to the practice in the motion picture industry of scheduling
production so that the picture could be completed, the exhibi-
tion prints made, and the majority of them shipped out of Cali-
fornia before the tax lien date. As a result, there was an idle
period of about two months prior to March 1, the tax lien date,
during which new picture productions were not undertaken.
The Michael Todd Company, which produced "Around the
World in 80 Days," miscalculated the time of completion of the
picture and the shipment of exhibition prints by the lien date.
As of the lien date, Todd had shipped only a small portion of
the prints to be made. Applying the valuation formula, the Los
Angeles County Assessor assessed a property tax of
$105,064.46.31 Todd paid the tax and sued for recovery on the
grounds that the principal value of a copyrighted motion pic-
ture consists of the intangible right to reproduce and exhibit it,
and under the California property tax statutes was exempt
from taxation.3 2
31. Id. at 688, 371 P.2d at 342, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
32. Id. at 688-89, 371 P.2d at 343, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 607. Todd's legal premise, consis-
tent with the copyright law, was that the value inherent in the intangible copyright is
the owner's right to copy, reproduce and exploit the literary property and this right is
separate and distinct from the tangible medium or film used to communicate the liter-
ary property.
See also Cal. Ops. Atty. Gen. NS 3208 (1941), holding that gross receipts derived by
the owner of a motion picture from its exhibition are in the nature of royalties from the
use of intangible personal property, and Sales Tax Rule 19 (current version at CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 1529), holding that, for tax purposes, motion picture producers
are consumers of the materials used in the production of motion pictures rather than
1979) 271
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The Supreme Court ruled that Todd's rights in the copy-
righted motion picture were a species of intangible personal
property, distinct from the tangible object or medium used to
reproduce and to exploit the film commercially. Therefore,
these rights were exempt from California property tax." The
court soundly rejected the County's assertion that the right to
use the negatives to make prints was tantamount to the right to
use tangible personal property, thereby transforming the right
of use itself into tangible property and subject to taxation.
The court's analysis was based upon the historical, constitu-
tional and legislative protection of copyrighted literary prop-
erty. It is these intangible rights that make literary properties
unique among all other real and tangible personal property.
However, while the court held that the right to reproduce a
copyrighted motion picture is intangible personal property ex-
empt from tax, it also held that, in view of Roehm, it was proper
for the County to employ an assessment valuation method
which attributed the value of the intangible right to reproduce
and to exploit the literary property to the value of the taxable
tangible property, i.e., the materials in the negative and sound
retailers of the pictures they produce. Both of these rulings are discussed at notes 50-
58, infra, and accompanying text.
33. 57 Cal. 2d at 689-92, 371 P.2d at 343-45, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 607-09.
34. Id. at 691, 371 P.2d at 344, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
[Diefendants confuse the physical ability to use the subject negatives for
making distribution prints with the legal right to do so. In effect defendants
confuse the use of the physical means of reproducing the copyrighted object
with the use of the copyright itself. Defendants assume that the right to use
the negatives for this purpose is identical with the right of an owner to make
lawful use of any tangible property in his possession, and cite as example the
right of an owner of a horse to ride his animal. But in so reasoning defendants
overlook the fact that the two types of rights-the right to copy and the right to
use tangible personal property in general-have different historical origins
and have consistently received different legislative and judicial treatment.
The right to ride one's horse is an attribute of the ownership of the horse itself;
and he who owns the material object ordinarily has both the physical ability
and the legal right to use it for any lawful purpose. . . . But the legal right to
make copies of copyrighted material derives from the copyright statute alone
and has never been deemed an attribute of the ownership of that material or
of the physical means of its reproduction.
In the light of these authorities it would appear that plaintiffs right to use
the subject negative to make distribution prints is intangible property and
hence, under our holding in Roehm.. ., could not as such be subjected to ad
valorem property taxation.
Id. at 691-93, 371 P.2d at 344-45, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09 (emphasis in original), citing
Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 (1948); Keesling, Conflicting
Concepts of Ownership in Taxation, 44 CAuF. L. REv. 866, 872-73 (1956).
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track.3 5
The practical effect of the Todd ruling was to indirectly tax
the value of the ostensibly exempt intangible property.36 The
Todd decision is inconsistent with property tax analysis and
with the historical treatment of motion picture films for Cali-
fornia sales and income tax purposes."
The cost of producing a motion picture may amount to many
millions of dollars. The cost of the film and other tangible
materials in the negative and sound track at most will amount
to several thousand dollars. To hold that the value of intangi-
ble literary property, which is tax exempt, can be included in
the valuation of the tangible materials is suggestive of a gnat
swallowing an elephant. By similar reasoning, the cost of the
paper in a manuscript should, for assessment purposes, in-
clude the cost of developing the story or play written on the
paper. Such development costs, particularly in the case of pro-
fessional writers, are often substantial. They may include ex-
tended trips to the locale of the story (perhaps in distant parts
of the world), trips to libraries in distant cities for research
purposes, and the expenses of maintaining an office. To in-
clude these costs with the cost of the paper, which is immate-
rial in comparison, and then to assess the manuscript on the
basis of the total aggregate cost, so far as is known, has never
been done.38
As a result of Todd, the Association of Motion Picture & Tele-
vision Producers sponsored a bill in the California legislature
to provide that the value of the tangible materials in a motion
picture would remain subject to tax and the value of the intan-
gible property would be exempt. The bill passed both houses
of the California legislature by large majorities, but was vetoed
by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr. In 1968, the Association
sponored a similar bill which was also passed by large majori-
ties of both houses of the legislature and signed into law by
35. 57 Cal. 2d at 695-97, 371 P.2d at 346-48, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 610-12.
36. See Note, Indirect Taxation of Motion Picture Copyright, 15 STAN. L. REV. 372
(1963).
37. See note 31, supra, and note 54, infra, and accompanying text. Moreover, be-
cause the Todd court focused on the reasonableness of the valuation methods used by
the County, the Court concluded that its ruling was not inconsistent with Sales Tax
Rule 19 (Regulation 1529) and Cal. Ops. Atty. Gen. NS 3208 (1941). See Michael Todd
Co., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d at 694-95, 371 P.2d at 346, 21 Cal. Rptr. at
610.
38. See note 29, supra.
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Governor Ronald Reagan."
Subsequently, the Los Angeles County Assessor sent a no-
tice to motion picture studios to the effect that black and white
exposed film would be valued on the basis of the value of the
chemicals, such as silver, which can be recovered from it (2c
per pound). The notice further stated that no value would be
attributed to exposed color film.
C. Master Tapes
There is no provision in the California law that prohibits the
indirect taxation of the intangible portion of a master tape.
County assessors, however, are not currently assessing master
tapes. This practice may be due to one or both of two reasons:
First, because of the similarity between master tapes and mo-
tion picture negatives and sound tracks, it is recognized that
they should be accorded similar tax treatment. Second, master
tapes produce a large inventory of records which are subject to
the tax on inventories if they are still in the state on the tax
lien date.
IV. Application of Calfornia Sales and Use Tax to Motion
Pictures and Sound Recordings
A. General Analysis
The California sales and use tax laws were enacted in 1933
and 1935, respectively.4 0 The sales tax is a tax upon "retailers"
for the privilege of making "retail sales" to the ultimate con-
sumer. This tax is measured by the gross receipts derived
from sales by the retailer of tangible personal property." The
39. 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 927, § 2 (amended 1974, codified at CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE
§ 988 (Deering 1975)) which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The full value of motion pictures, including the negatives and prints
thereof, is the full value of only the tangible materials upon which such motion
pictures are recorded. Such full value does not include the value of, or any
value based upon, any intangible rights, such as the copyright or the right to
reproduce, copy, exhibit or otherwise exploit motion pictures or the negatives
or prints thereof.
40. 1933 Cal. Stats. ch. 1020; 1935 Cal. Stats. ch. 361.
41. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6012, 6051 (Deering 1975). Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 232 Cal. App. 2d 91, 95, 42 Cal. Rptr. 543-46 (1965). "Retail
sales" include the sale to the ultimate consumer of tangible personal property in the
ordinary course of a retailer's business. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6007 (Deering 1975).
A "retailer" is defined as every seller who is engaged in the business of making retail
sales and/or makes a retail sale of tangible personal property. Id. at § 6015.
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California use tax (the complement to the sales tax) is an ex-
cise tax imposed upon the storage, use or other consumption of
tangible personal property purchased from a retailer. It is
measured by the sales price of the property.4 2
The Revenue and Taxation Code broadly defines "sale" and
"purchase" to include any transfer of title or possession, condi-
tional or otherwise, by any means, of tangible personal prop-
erty for a consideration, and the producing, fabricating,
processing, printing or imprinting of tangible personal prop-
erty for consumers who furnish the materials used therein.4 3
Tangible personal property means "personal property which
may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched or which is in
any other manner perceptible to the senses."" Since the sales
tax statutes often refer to tangible personal property, the stat-
utes make clear the legislative distinction between tangible
and intangible personal property, the latter being exempt from
taxation.5
A number of exemptions from the sales tax are recognized in
regulations prescribed by the Board of Equalization. One ex-
emption applicable to literary properties is the "service enter-
prises" exemption.4 6 Persons rendering personal services are
consumers, not retailers, of the tangible personal property
which they may use in connection with the service. Accord-
42. Id. at §§ 6201-47.
43. Id. at § 6006(a) and (b); § 6010(a) and (b).
44. Id. at § 6016.
45. See Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 57 P.2d 1022 (.1936). The
Roth Drug case was one of the first actions to challenge the constitutionality of the
sales tax. The court stated:
The taxing of tangible personal property as distinguished from intangible
property is perfectly natural and reasonable. That is a distinction commonly
recognized by the law. . . . Tangible property is that which is visible and cor-
poreal, having substance and body as contrasted with incorporeal property
rights such as franchises, choses in action, copyrights, the circulation of a
newspaper, annuities and the like. . . .
The reason for distinguishing between tangible and intangible property for
the purpose of taxation is very evident. The first is visible, accessible and easy
to identify and levy upon, while the other is not so readily located or its value
ascertained. There is no room for logical controversy over the right to distin-
guish between tangible and intangible property for the purpose of taxation.
Id. at 734-35, 57 P.2d at 1028 (citations omitted). See also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 232 Cal. App. 2d 91, 42 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1965). The court stated
"[c] learly that portion of the gross receipts representing the transfer of leases (a chat-
tel real) was not taxable, because, although personal property, it was not tangible per-
sonalty." Id. at 96, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (emphasis in original).
46. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 18, § 1501 [hereinafter cited as Regulation 1501].
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ingly, the author who writes a manuscript and transfers it to a
publisher is providing a service and is not regarded as selling
tangible personal property. The fact that title to the paper on
which the story is written passes.to the purchaser of the story
is disregarded for sales tax purposes, partly because of the pa-
per's slight value and also because the transfer of the paper is
incidental to the transfer of the ownership of the story. How-
ever, the sales tax is applied to the retail sale of reproduced
copies of the author's story to the ultimate consumer. The
purchaser of a book acquires the right to possess the book, a
tangible property, but he acquires no interest in the story or
play itself, an intangible property, and no right to reproduce or
otherwise exploit it. The ownership of the story or play is not
transferred but remains the property of another person, usu-
ally the publisher. Such a transaction should be sharply dis-
tinguished from the sale of a manuscript which usually results
in a transfer of the ownership of the story or play which gives
the purchaser the right to reproduce the story or play commer-
cially. Also, implicit in the policy behind Regulation 1501 is the
principle that what the person rendering the service is trans-
ferring is the expression of a creative mind and talent, a spe-
cies of intangible personal property which is separate and
distinct from the tangible medium used for conveying the ex-
pression." Other California statutes support this policy."
47. Regulation 1501 governs transactions in which a person is engaged in the busi-
ness of rendering services and tangible personal property which is incidentally used as
part of the service. Regulation 1501 provides in pertinent part:
The basic distinction in determining whether a particular transaction in-
volves a sale of tangible personal property or the transfer of tangible personal
property incidental to the performance of a service is one of the true objects of
the contract; that is, is the real object sought by the buyer the service per se or
the property produced by the service. If the true object of the contract is the
service per se the transaction is not subject to tax even though some tangible
personal property is transferred. Thus, the transfer to a publisher of an origi-
nal manuscript by the author thereof for the purpose of publication is not sub-
ject to taxation. The author is the consumer of the paper on which he has
recorded the text of his creation. . . .
See also Putnam, Application of California Sales and Use Tax Law and Selected
Types of Transactions, 23 S. CAL. TAX INST. 289, 293 (1973).
48. See, e.g., Sales Tax Counsel Ruling 12-15-65, Cal. Tax Serv. Ann. 515.0380 (origi-
nal designs or plans produced for clients by architects or engineers); Sales Tax Coun-
sel Ruling 6-26-55, Cal. Tax Serv. Ann. 515.1220 (fees paid to a patent draftsman); Sales
Tax Counsel Ruling 3-11-66, Cal. Tax Serv. Ann. 515.0660 (research and development
contracts).
A person contracting for research and development is primarily contracting
for information which is intangible. Generally, the person contracting for in-
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B. Motion Pictures and Motion Picture Producers
Shortly after the California sales tax became effective on Au-
gust 1, 1933, the Board of Equalization adopted a regulation
consistent with the principle that a motion picture is intangible
personal property, separate and distinct from the material me-
dium by which the picture is communicated."o This regulation
treats the producer of a motion picture as the consumer of all
tangible materials used in the production of a motion picture
and accordingly the sales tax applies only to the tangible
materials purchased by the producer and used in making the
picture. The producer is not treated as the retailer of a com-
pleted motion picture, and therefore Regulation 1529 concludes
that amounts received from the intangible rights to copy, to
reproduce and commercially to exhibit the film are exempt
from sales tax." Implicit in the policy of Regulation 1529 is the
principle that the purchaser of a motion picture pays for two
separate and distinct property rights: the right to own and use
the tangible materials in a motion picture, and the right to
copy, to reproduce and to exploit the copyrighted motion pic-
ture, which is a species of intangible property exempt from tax-
formation is going to use it to manufacture and sell some item of tangible per-
sonal property.
The development of the information in a research and development contract
is not a sale of tangible personal property. It is a service. Since the informa-
tion such as plans, design, parts lists, etc., cannot ordinarily be conveyed
orally, the information is conveyed on paper. The transfer of the information
on paper is not a sale of tangible personal property, and the transfer is inci-
dental to the service of developing the information. In a few rare instances,
the information cannot be conveyed without the transfer of a prototype. In
these cases the transfer of the prototype is incidental to the transfer of the
information and is not a sale of the prototype. In most instances the informa-
tion cannot be developed without the production of a prototype, but the infor-
mation can be conveyed without it. In these instances, if the prototype is also
transferred, it is a sale of the prototype along with a sale of intangible informa-
tion.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-85 (Deering 1971) (personal property rights in prod-
ucts of mind); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14700-40 (Deering 1976) (business rights in
authorship); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (Deering Supp. 1979) (unauthorized sale of
sound recordings). See notes 13-14 and accompanying text, supra.
50. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 18, § 1529 (formerly § 1929) [hereinafter cited as Regula-
tion 1529]. Following the adoption of the California use tax in 1935, a similar rule was
applied to the purchase by California motion picture producers and studios to motion
picture productions which were purchased outside California and which were later
brought into California. This use tax exemption has also been incorporated in Regula-
tion 1529.
51. Id. at § 1529(a).
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ation.5 2 The sale of a motion picture transfers title to tangible
property, such as negatives, sound tracts and positive prints,
just as the sale of a manuscript transfers title to the paper.
Transfers of such tangible property are disregarded for sales
tax purposes.
The California Attorney General has expressed the opinion
that the principal value of a motion picture consists of the right
to reproduce it. Further, the receipts derived by the owner of a
motion picture from a theater for the privilege of exhibiting a
motion picture constitutes royalties for the use of intangible
literary property rather than rentals for the use of tangible per-
sonal property."
Regulation 1529 provides that, in the event of a sale by the
producer of a motion picture after the picture's first release
date, the transfer constitutes a sale of tangible personal prop-
erty subject to the sales tax." The validity of this provision is
questionable. It is difficult to justify a difference in the treat-
ment of the sale of a picture that has been released and the
sale of one that is unreleased. In both cases there is a transfer
of the right to reproduce intangible literary property. It would
seem that the rule applicable to the sale of an unreleased pic-
ture should apply to the sale of one that has been released."
52. Michael Todd Co., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 695 n.4, 371 P.2d
340, 346 n.4, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 610 n.4 (1962), where the court stated that its holding that
the copyrighted motion picture is intangible property and exempt from property taxa-
tion is not inconsistent with Sales Tax Ruling 19, CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 18, § 1529. See
note 32, supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 46-49, supra.
54. See Cal. Ops Atty. Gen. NS 3208 at 4 (1941), which states:
The principal value given to motion picture film is given by the copyright,
which protects the owner or licensee from competition or unauthorized dupli-
cation, and certainly one who pays for the privilege of distributing or display-
ing a copyrighted film pays largely for the use of the copyright.
55. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 18, § 1529(c)(1)(C). See also Sales Tax Counsel Ruling
2-3-66, 3 CAL. TAX RpR. (CCH) 60-127.81, Cal. Tax Serv. Ann. 375.0620, which provides
as follows:
When television films and tapes are shipped from a point outside this state
by the producer to a California television station without having been first
publicly shown on stations outside this state, the measure of the use tax is the
material cost to the producer of the films and tapes....
56. See Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson 13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 734, 57 P.2d 1022, 1031 (1936).
See also note 45, supra, and accompanying text. Noteworthy are two Sales Tax Coun-
sel Rulings which are applications of the exemption from taxation of intangible prop-
erty. Sales Tax Counsel Ruling 11-12-58, 3 CAL. TAX RPTR. (CCH) 60-242.38, Cal. Tax
Serv. Ann. 395.1260, which provides as follows:
Sales of intangible personal property and real property not being covered by
the taxing provisions of the Sales and Use Tax Law, should not be considered
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Regulation 1529 has remained in effect continuously since its
adoption. These rules have been interpreted to apply to the
sale of television commercials, provided that the commercials
have sufficient continuity to be classified as a motion picture
production. The rules have undergone some changes over
the years, which were necessary to adapt to new technologies
and methods of motion picture production."
In 1965, the sales and use tax laws were amended to include
the lease of tangible personal property within the definition of
"sale" and "purchase."5 9 However, "any lease of motion pic-
tures, including television, films and tapes" was specifically ex-
empted from these new provisions. 0 The lease provisions
apply to various other transactions in the motion picture in-
dustry, particularly facility transactions in which a studio
makes sets, props, and costumes available to an independent
producer, but does not itself participate in the production of
the picture.
Some states do not treat motion picture films as intangible
included within the meaning of 'property' as used in Sec. 6006.5(b) (the Occa-
sional Sale Rule)
and Sales Tax Counsel Ruling 3-10-58, 3 CAL. TAX RPTR. (CCH) 60-242.39, which pro-
vides as follows:
In the sale of a business consisting of vending machines on location, the
sales tax does not apply to that portion of the contract price which represents
the intangible value of the location privileges.
57. See Sales Tax Counsel Ruling 12-22-55, 3 CAL. TAX RPTR. (CCH) 60-127.11, Cal.
Tax Serv. Ann. 375.0300:
Motion picture productions include advertising commercials provided the
commercial is a complete picture as distinguished from trailers, stock shots or
other portions of complete productions. The producer is regarded as the con-
sumer of all film and other property used in the production of commercials.
As the consumer, the producer is not regarded as selling tangible personal
property and is not required to pay sales tax on its gross receipts from an
advertising agency. The tax applies to the cost to him of the film and other
property . . .
58. For example, in 1961, the California Board of Equalization adopted a compre-
hensive set of rules for the application of the sales and use taxes to the motion picture
industry. The Board restated all of the rules and exemptions mentioned above, and
also set forth rules covering a great many situations beyond the scope of this article.
Previously, the Board had taken the position that in a case of a motion picture made by
a major studio and an independent producer, acting jointly, there was a fabrication of
the picture by the major studio and the entire cost of the picture was subject to the
sales tax. Under the 1961 comprehensive rules this position was abandoned. Instead,
the term "coproducer" was interpreted to refer to the relationship between a major
studio and an independent producer. See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, §§ 1529(b) (2) and
(c) (1) (A).
59. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6006(g), 6010(e) (Deering 1975).
60. Id. at §§ 6006(g)(1), 6010(e)(1).
280 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
literary property for sales tax purposes. In these states, re-
ceipts from the sale or licensing of motion pictures are subject
to sales tax under laws imposing a tax on the sale, lease or
transfer of possession or license to use tangible personal prop-
erty." The rationale advanced by these jurisdictions is that
the "finished product" (i.e., the combination of the copyrighted
motion picture and the negative and prints) is the subject of
the sale, lease or licensing transaction, and that the license
alone to exhibit or broadcast the picture without the tangible
finished product would be valueless. Accordingly, these states
create the fiction that the intangible right to copy, to reproduce
and to exhibit the motion picture is inseparable from the tangi-
ble negative and prints, and therefore all receipts derived from
the transaction are taxable. 62 This legal fiction was engaged in
by Los Angeles County in its briefs in Todd," and was rejected
by the court."
However, few of these states, if any, have as substantial a
stake in the growth and prosperity of the motion picture indus-
try as California has. Several other states, however, have held
that the licensor of a motion picture retains his ownership in-
61. See Turner Communications Corp. v. Chilivis, 236 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. 1977), rev'g
231 S.E.2d 425; Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. Vermont Commissioner of Taxes,
336 A.2d 193 (Vt. 1975); Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc. 282 So. 2d 892 (Ala.
1973); American Television Co., Inc. v. Hervey, 490 S.W.2d 796 (Ark. 1973); Florida Ass'n
of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So. 2d 437, cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1972); Crescent
Amusement Co. v. Carson, 213 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1948); Saenger Realty Corp. v. Gros-
jean, 193 So. 710 (La. 1940); and United Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 7 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1937).
62. For example, in Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc. 282 So. 2d 892 (Ala.
1973), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that leased television films were tangible
personal property and subject to the privilege or license tax on their rental or lease.
The court stated:
It is true a copyright may be an incorporeal right to publish and exist de-
tached from the corporeal property out of which it arises . .. however, a copy-
right only represents the materials composing it. It is the films or finished
products which are leased here, not the copyright itself.
Id. at 894. In Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 213 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1948), the Ten-
nessee court similarly stated:
There is scarcely to be found any article susceptible to sale or rent that is
not the result of an idea, genius, skill and labor applied to a physical sub-
stance. . . . If these elements should be separated from the finished product
and the sales tax applied only to the cost of the raw material, the sales tax act
would, for all practical purposes, be entirely destroyed. . . .
Id. at 29.
63. See Brief for Respondent at 16-17, Michael Todd Co., Inc. v. County of Los An-
geles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 371 P.2d 340, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1962).
64. Michael Todd Co., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 691, 371 P.2d 340,
347, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 611 (1962). See also notes 30-34, supra, and accompanying text.
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terest in the motion picture and confers upon the licensee only
the intangible right to reproduce and to exhibit the film. In
these jurisdictions, no sale or lease of tangible personal prop-
erty is considered to occur for sales tax purposes.65
C. Master Tapes
Motion pictures and master tapes are very similar and ac-
cordingly should be treated the same for sales, use and prop-
erty tax purposes. Both involve the performance by individual
artists of new ideas, sounds and forms of creative expression
which must be recorded on tangible materials. Furthermore, a
master tape is produced in much the same manner as a motion
picture sound track.
Effective January 1, 1976, both the sales and use tax laws
were amended to provide that the sale or licensing of master
tapes should be taxed in much the same manner as motion pic-
tures. 6 6 The gross receipts from the sale or leasing of master
tapes are now exempt from sales or use tax to the extent they
are attributable to copyrightable, artistic, or intangible ele-
ments.
The Board of Equalization formerly treated master tapes dif-
ferently than motion pictures for sales and use tax purposes.
It exempted from sales and use tax the so-called mechanical
royalties or publishing royalties paid to composers of music
and lyrics." However, receipts from the sale or leasing of
master tapes, unlike the receipts from the sale or leasing of
65. Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Watson Indus., Inc. v. Shaw, 69 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. 1952); Paramount-Richards Theatres,
Inc. v. State, 55 So. 2d 812 (Ala. 1951); A.B.C. Electrotype Co. v. Ames, 4 N.E.2d 476 (Ill.
1936); J.A. Burgess Co. v. Ames, 194 N.E. 565 (Ill. 1935).
66. 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 1116 (adding new CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6362.5).
67. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6362.5 (Deering Supp. 1979), which provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this part the gross re-
ceipts from the sale or lease of, and the storage, use, or other consumption in
this state of, master tapes or master records embodying sound, except
amounts subject to the taxes imposed by other provisions of this part paid by
a customer in connection with the customer's production of master tapes or
master records to a recording studio for the tangible elements of such master
records or master tapes.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(2) Amounts paid for the furnishing of the tangible elements shall not in-
clude any amounts paid for the copyrightable, artistic or intangible elements
of such master tapes or master records, whether designated as royalties or
otherwise.
68. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 18, § 1527(a)(4) (amended 1975). Copyright protection
for musical compositions is somewhat different than for other types of literary prop-
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motion pictures, were taxable as receipts from the sale or leas-
ing of tangible property." In view of the similarities between
master tapes and motion pictures this former rule seems
clearly wrong.70 A number of cases challenging the validity of
assessments made pursuant to this former rule are pending in
the California courts. 7 '
The synopsis of Senate Bill 512, prepared by the Assembly
Revenue and Taxation Committee, details the philosophy
which prompted the enactment of section 6362.5.72 The Assem-
erty. Once a composition has been recorded commercially, anyone may record it by
paying to the copyright proprietor, who is usually the composer, a "mechanical roy-
alty" equal to 2 3 c for each copy of the reproduction pursuant to the compulsory li-
censing provision of the Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. 1 1977).
69. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, TIT. 18, §§ 1527(a) (1) and (b).
70. Prior to 1972 the Act did not provide copyright protection for an artist's re-
corded performance. It may be urged that this circumstance affords a reasonable basis
for distinguishing between master tapes on the one hand and motion pictures on the
other since motion pictures have been accorded federal copyright protection for many
years. There are, however, two convincing arguments against such a basis for differen-
tiation in treatment. First, in 1968, as a result of the increasing number of record piracy
cases, the California legislature enacted Cal. Penal Code, § 653h, making it a criminal
offense to:
knowingly and willfully transfer or cause to be transferred any sounds that
have been recorded on phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other arti-
cles in which sounds are recorded, with the intent to sell or cause to sell, or to
use or cause to be used for profit through public performance, such articles in
which record sound are so transferred, without the consent of the owner.
See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), holding § 653h constitutional and
within the states' concurrent power to protect literary property, thereby creating the
equivalent of state copyright protection.
Although a copyright gives great protection to literary property and may increase
the value of such property, the copyright is not the same as the property itself. Ever
since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 447 (1854), it has been consistently held in the federal and California courts
that literary property includes such intangible things as maps, stories, plays, songs and
music, and that such literary property is separate and distinct from the tangible media
used to reproduce it. Therefore, regardless of the existence of copyright protection,
the transfer of a master tape should have been taxed the same as a motion picture at
all times since the enactment of the Sales and Use Tax Acts inasmuch as in each case
there is a transfer of the right to reproduce intangible literary property.
As a result of the large number of record piracy cases throughout the United States,
the former Federal Copyright Act was amended to extend copyright protection to
sound recordings. Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (adding 17
U.S.C. § 1(f)). Present copyright law continues this protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7)
(Supp. 11977).
71. E.g., Capital Records, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, Civil Case No. 255286,
Superior Court of California, Sacramento County. In Simplicity Pattern Company,
Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 3d 184 (1980), pet. for hrg. granted,
(Apr. 10, 1980), the appellate court reached conclusions similar to those expressed
herein, and for much the same reasons. Id. at 188-89.
72. ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMM., SYNOPSIS OF S.B. 512, (Aug. 13, 1975)
(on file with authors).
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bly Report substantially supports the author's analysis by stat-
ing that:
While it is true that a master recording is indeed used in the
initial physical production of tapes and records for retail sale, it
seems clear that the utility of that particular recording is not
its tangible elements (e.g., magnetic tape) but its intangible el-
ement, namely, the sound embodied in it.
The sound is what is being purchased in the sale/lease of a
master recording. The tangible elements of such recording
serve only to convey the sound. If it were possible to convey
the sound on an intangible element such as ether, or laser
light, then the sale/lease would solely constitute intangible ele-
ments, and there could be no question as to possible taxability.
Since the royalties and the sound attached to a master re-
cording transaction are inextricably linked, the Board's current
practice of assessing sales tax on royalties is akin to taxation of
intangibles, which is prohibited by law.7 3
D. Consequences of a Ruling that Master Tapes Are Intangible
Personal Property Exempt from Sales Tax
If California courts rule that master tapes are intangible per-
sonal property exempt from sales and use tax, a significant bat-
tle will have been won. The war however, may not have ended,
since such a ruling may lead the Internal Revenue Service to
claim that the investment tax credit is not available for master
tapes. Concern over such a result is unwarranted.
Federal courts have consistently rejected the Service's asser-
tion that a copyrighted motion picture film is intangible per-
sonal property for which the investment tax credit is not
available.74  The investment tax credit was enacted by Con-
gress to encourage capital investment. Accordingly, Congress
73. Id. at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
74. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1971), 1971-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. ' 9507, affd as modified 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9484, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Disney I]; Walt Disney
Prods., Inc. v. United States, 1974-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9623 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dis-
missed per stipulation, No. 74-2988 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Disney
II]; Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977), 1976-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. ' 9606 (1966), as amended 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9398 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Disney III]. See also Hanna Barbera Prods., Inc. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
1 9365 (relating to television motion picture negatives and sound masters); Texas In-
struments, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977), 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ' 9384,
affg, rev'g and rem'g 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976), 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9312 (relat-
ing to the recording of offshore seismic data on tapes and film).
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did not limit the definition of "tangible personal property"
when the credit was enacted.
Under regulations promulgated by the Treasury Depart-
ment, the investment tax credit's application to copyrights and
patents was precluded because the Treasury Department
deemed them not to be tangible personal property.6 Specifi-
cally, Treasury Regulation 1.48-1(f) stated that the cost of ob-
taining a copyright or patent included all costs of purchasing or
producing the copyrighted or patented item, thus excluding
such items from consideration for the investment credit. Mo-
tion pictures were the illustration of costs expended to pro-
duce a copyright. 7
Three tax cases have applied the investment credit to motion
pictures.7 1 In Disney I, the court held Regulation 1.48-1(f) inva-
lid and concluded that a motion picture film qualified as tangi-
ble personal property qualifying for the investment tax
credit.
The Treasury cited the federal copyright laws and the Todd
case,8 0 and argued that a copyrighted motion picture had his-
torically been characterized as intangible personal property
separate and distinct from the tangible medium used to exhibit
the picture and that because the significant portion of the cost
of the motion picture was attributable to intangible property,
such costs did not qualify for the investment tax credit. The
Disney I court summarily rejected this argument by the treas-
ury. The court reasoned that Congress chose not to limit the
definition of tangible property, and, accordingly, the Treasury
could not by regulation substantively define property eligible
for the credit.
Congress concurred with the district court's holding in Dis-
ney I, and indicated its intention that all capitalized costs of a
motion picture qualify for the investment tax credit."' The
Court of Appeals in Disney I, taking judicial notice of Con-
75. I.R.C. H§ 38; 46-48.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(f) (1962). See H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A 18,
1962-3 C.B. 504, 516; S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154, 1962-3 C.B. 707, 858.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(f) (1962).
78. See Disney I, Disney II, Disney III, supra note 74.
79. 1971-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9507, at pp. 87,046-47.
80. Michael Todd Co., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 371 P.2d 340, 21
Cal. Rptr. 604 (1962).
81. See S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971) (relating to the Revenue
Act of 1971). See also Miller & Nimmons, Intangibles: Investment Credit and Amortiza-
tion, 26 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1115 (1974).
284 [Vol. 2
TAXATION OF LITERARY PROPERTIES
gress' express intent, held that all costs of producing the mo-
tion picture were includable in the base of qualified investment
of tangible personal property for investment tax credit pur-
poses.8 2
The Service, not conceding defeat, filed suit against Walt Dis-
ney Productions for motion picture films produced in taxable
years other than those at issue in Disney I. Again, the courts
unanimously rejected the Treasury's claim.13
Disney I, Disney II and Disney III are not necessarily incon-
sistent with Todd, and are clearly distinguishable with respect
to legislative policy and intent. The Disney courts did not stray
from the principle that the right to copy, to reproduce and to
commercially exploit a motion picture is an intangible right,
separate and distinct from the medium used to exhibit the pic-
ture. The Disney decisions were based upon the courts' recog-
nition of the Congressional intent to foster capital investment.
The final chapter in this controversy was written in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. Section 804 of that Act crystallized the Dis-
ney holdings by expressly making the investment tax credit
available to motion picture and television films.8 4 However, the
Act was silent on the availability of the investment tax credit to
master tapes. While no court decision has squarely faced this
issue, based upon the similarity in technology and production
between master tapes and motion pictures films, the economic
policy legislated by Congress and the judicial interpretation of
that policy in Disney I, Disney II and Disney III, as well as
Hanna Barbera and Texas Instruments," there should be little
doubt that a court would make available the investment tax
credit for master tapes.
Conclusion
It has long been recognized that maps, stories, plays, music
and lyrics are intangible literary property separate and distinct
from the tangible materials on which they are recorded. A per-
son who acquires the ownership of tangible materials does not
necessarily acquire ownership of the literary property re-
82. Disney I, supra note 74, 480 F.2d at 68.
83. Disney II, Disney III, supra note 74.
84. Act of October 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 804, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (adding new
I.R.C. § 48(k)).
85. See cases cited at note 74, supra.
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corded on them and in the absence of a license does not ac-
quire the right to reproduce the property commercially.
Shortly after the California Sales Tax Act was enacted .in
1933, a rule was adopted that motion picture producers are con-
sumers of the materials they use, and that the sale of the com-
pleted motion picture, negative or positive print is not a
taxable retail sale. This rule is consistent with the foregoing
views as to literary property and its relationship to the tangible
materials on which it is recorded.
The Attorney General of California expressed a similar con-
clusion about a provision in the California Personal Income
Tax Act that receipts derived from licensing exhibition of posi-
tive prints of a motion picture supplied by the owner consti-
tuted royalties for the use of intangible property rather than
rentals for the use of tangible personal property.
The legislature has enacted statutes applying the same basic
principles to the property taxation of motion pictures, to the
sale and use taxation of leasing of motion pictures, television
films and tapes and to the sales and use taxation after 1976 of
master tapes.
It follows from the foregoing principles that the property tax
should apply to master tapes in the same manner as it applies
to motion pictures-that only the nominal value of the tangible
materials should be subject to the property tax.
Consistent with the foregoing principles, the California sales
and use tax laws for years prior to the 1976 legislation should
apply to master tapes in the same manner they have been ap-
plied to motion pictures and to master tapes after 1976. The
producer of a master tape should be considered the consumer
of the materials used in the production of the tape, and the sale
of a master tape should not result in a taxable sale of tangible
personal property.
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